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I
INTRODUCTION

At this point, the focus of the symposium shifts away from possible
legislative reforms of malpractice law in order to consider whether some relief
from malpractice problems might be obtainable through private action-that
is, through private contracts altering the responsibilities of health care
providers and the legal rights of patients.' The first thesis to be presented
here, in opening this subject, is that the idea of private reform in the area of
medical malpractice squares nicely both with recent developments in national
health policy and with recent changes in the health care industry itself. It will
also be contended that the legal system, to the extent that it is unreceptive to
contractual variations of its rules governing medical accidents, is out of touch
with recent developments and needs to have its premises reexamined. The
observations here support the view that tort law must recede from a dogmatic
regulatory role in which it alone specifies rights arising out of the
provider/patient relationship and should recognize that private agreements
altering its prescriptions may benefit everyone appropriately concernedeveryone, that is, except malpractice lawyers.
An examination of the implications of recent health sector developments
for malpractice reform should be helpful to several audiences. Those who
focus their attention primarily on liability issues are apt to be only generally
aware of what is happening in health policy and in the health care marketplace
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and may not fully appreciate the connection between those developments and
what is happening, or might happen, in the tort arena. Similarly, those
concerned with overall health policy may view the malpractice problem as a
tangential matter falling into a separate policy compartment-even though
this body of law defines important elements of the provider/patient
relationship and generates incentives powerfully influencing provider
behavior. Finally, employers, insurers, and other intermediaries who
purchase health care as agents for consumers may fail to see how malpractice
law affects, perhaps adversely, the cost and quality of the services they are
buying.
Even if some of these various observers do appreciate that malpractice law
affects larger interests, they are still likely to view malpractice issues as
addressable only through the courts or through specialized political processes
engaging rather different protagonists than are usually involved in making
health policy. Yet malpractice issues may be too important to be resolved
definitively by judges or in legislative showdowns between organized
medicine and organized trial lawyers. It is at least possible that the same
public policies and private initiatives that are currently transforming health
care financing and delivery will in time, if given a chance, bring about
meaningful and desirable reforms in the way society allocates the risk of
iatrogenic injury. 2 Those private interests that are currently engaged in
revolutionizing the health services industry should certainly not neglect to
explore opportunities for redefining legal rights and remedies in the interest
of improving the climate and efficiency of medical practice and giving
consumers better value for their money.
In addition to demonstrating that the new health care marketplace offers
unprecedented opportunities for reforming malpractice rules through
consumer choice, this article examines the legal obstacles in this path to
reform. Not the least of these obstacles is the natural conservatism of lawyers
who, in counselling health care providers, tend immediately to discount the
possibility that tort rights might be effectively altered by private agreement.
Such caution is perhaps warranted in a legal system that is generally
distrustful of private contract as a vehicle for defining consumers' rights. 3
Nevertheless, it will be shown here that there is no reason automatically to
presume judicial hostility to all contracts altering malpractice liability.
Indeed, with the emergence of a competitive market for health services and
new opportunities for informed purchasing by consumers and their agents,
courts may now have even less reason to view contractual modifications of tort
rights skeptically. One purpose of this article is to encourage creative
lawyering in the structuring and defense of such agreements.

2.
3.

Reasons for not being unduly sanguine about this prospect are given in note 91, ilfra.
See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
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II
THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH HEALTH CARE

Is

BOUGHT AND SOLD

The suggestion that the legal remedies of patients injured in the course of
medical treatment should be alterable by private contract and not exclusively
by public action will seem more sensible with an appreciation of how the
health care industry and ways of thinking about health care itself have
changed in recent years. Old assumptions, which contemplated centralized
decisionmaking on virtually all questions, are now rapidly giving way to the
notion that consumer choice can reliably guide industry development and the
allocation of resources to and within the health care sector. The discussion
here reports briefly on how decisionmaking authority is shifting away from
health care providers to consumers, how changing public policy has fostered
this development, and how old conceptions of health care are being replaced
by new ones. It will appear that consumers are increasingly in a position to
negotiate with providers mutually advantageous relationships that feature,
among other things, rights and responsibilities with respect to medical
injuries that differ from those prescribed in the law of torts.
A.

From Monolithic "System" to Decentralized, Competitive "Industry"

The changes that have overtaken the U.S. health care industry in the
1980's are more revolutionary than is commonly appreciated. This period has
seen the end of the long era during which health care was generally deemed
to be a uniform product produced by a single, monolithic system dominated
by the providers of care. 4 The development most widely noted as
undermining provider dominance is the increasing aggressiveness of large
purchasers of services in demanding provider attention to their concerns
about health care costs. 5 Government and private purchasers of health care

have now learned that their old, provider-approved practice of agreeing to
reimburse virtually any cost that providers or patients elected to incur was an
invitation to high prices and wasteful spending. As a result of the new
attitudes and policies that these purchasers have adopted, consumers are now
able to reject the dominant system's standardized product by choosing to
receive care through innovative delivery mechanisms and under new financing
arrangements. New payment methods are forcing many traditional fee-forThe fullest description of the old provider-dominated system and how it came to be is given
See also J. BERLANT,
PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY 58-127, 177-308 (1975); Clark, Why Does Health Care Regulation Fail?, 41
MD. L. REV. 1, 4 (1981) (discussing "the deference that our legal sYstem pays to the judgments of the
medical profession"); Havighurst, The Doctors' Trust: Self-Regulation and the Law, HEALTH AFF., Fall
1983, at 64.
4.

in P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).

5. See, e.g., J. GOLDSMITH, CAN HOSPITALS SURVIVE?: THE NEW COMPETITIVE HEALTH CARE
MARKET (1981); LEWIN & ASSOCIATES, INC., SYNTHESIS OF PRIVATE SECTOR HEALTH CARE INITIATIVES

(March 1984) (report prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services); Arnett, Cowell, Davidoff & Freeland, Health
Spending Trends in the 1980's: Adjusting to FinancialIncentives, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spring 1985, at 1.
On the federal government's new aggressiveness as a payer, see infra text accompanying notes 10-1l.
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service providers to adjust their practice styles and administrative methods, to
submit to or institute controls on spending, to set competitive prices, and to
accept prospectively determined payments for treating a given condition, a
given patient, or a given population. As physicians and hospitals respond to
new economic realities, hospital admissions are fewer, stays are shorter, and
operating efficiencies are being achieved. 6 In general, cost-conscious
purchasing and provider competition are revealing that the standardized
product produced by the old health care system was not necessarily the best
value.
Several specific factors have contributed to strengthening the hands of
cost-conscious parties on the demand side of the health care marketplace.
Increases in the supply of both physician personnel and hospital facilities have
intensified competition among providers, making them more responsive to
purchasers' cost concerns. Aggressive application of the antitrust laws to the
health care sector, which began only in the mid-1970's, now keeps providers
from continuing to dictate-by boycotts and other collective means-the
kinds of delivery and financing arrangements that can be employed. 7 In

particular, antitrust enforcement has assisted the growth of health
maintenance organizations (HMO's), a development that was important not
only in its own right but also because it enabled the private sector to

recognize that delivery arrangements differing from those prescribed by
professional custom were feasible and cost-effective and could be attractive to
many consumers.

If one had to identify the crucial event in the awakening of the private
sector to its cost containment responsibilities and opportunities, that event
would have to be Congress's defeat in 1979 of the Carter Administration's
proposals for hospital cost containment. That legislative action effectively
signaled that the federal government was not, after all, going to assume
ultimate responsibility for the nation's overall health care bill and that private
purchasers of health care, instead of waiting for government to solve the
problem, should look out for themselves. This message was immediately
reinforced by new legislative proposals looking to stimulate competition and
cost-conscious consumer choice in the health care sector,8 by favorable
references to competition in the 1979 amendments to the federal health
planning legislation, 9 and by the election of a conservative president in 1980.
6. See, e.g., Davis, Anderson, Renn, Rowland, Schramm & Steinberg, Is Cost Containment
Working?, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1985, at 81. As this study notes, there are numerous possible
explanations for the trends discussed, but it is clear that something important has happened and
coincides in time with substantial changes in purchasers' attitudes. Id. at 91.
7. See, e.g., Havighurst, The ContributionsofAntitrust Law to a Procompetitive Health Policy, in MARKET
REFORMS, supra note 1, at 295; Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing,
1978 DUKE L.J. 303 [hereinafter cited as Havighurst, Professional Restraints].
8. The sponsors of these bills included health policy experts from both parties. See, e.g., S.
1485, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Sen. Durenberger); S. 1590, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Sen.
Schweiker); H.R. 7527, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (Reps. Gephardt and Stockman); H.R. 7528,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (Rep. Jones).
9. Pub. L. No. 96-79, § 103, 93 Stat. 592, 594-95 (1979) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2
(1982)).
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Unlike the Carter Administration, the Reagan Administration emphasized that
private health care costs were a private responsibility and addressed itself to
controlling, not overall health care costs, but the costs of public programs
alone. In pursuing this policy, Congress set for the private sector a
particularly vivid example in prudent purchasing of health care by shifting the
Medicare program from retrospective cost reimbursement to payment for
specific treatments on the basis of uniform, prospectively determined prices.' 0
In addition, the federal government encouraged the states to bargain
aggressively with providers in administering Medicaid."I Once government
removed itself as the party responsible for private health care costs, the stage
was finally set for market forces to assert themselves, and they have begun to
do so.
Although consumer ignorance had long been deemed to preclude a
workably competitive market for health services, consumers of health care are
encountering

no

appreciable

difficulties

in

the

emerging

competitive

environment because they have been able to rely upon sophisticated agents to
bargain with providers on their behalf. Thus, employers and unions,
representing consumers' interest in cost containment, 12 have begun to
demand lower-cost alternatives that do not sacrifice essential quality.
Increasingly, employers are selecting from the larger universe of options a
limited menu of health plans or providers from which the employees
themselves can finally choose, partly on the basis of price. Organized health
plans, such as HMO's and preferred provider organizations (PPO's), are
increasing their market shares, in part because they serve the consumer as
knowledgeable middlemen capable of selecting providers and obtaining their
services on desirable terms and of overseeing their performance. Other
institutions and middlemen, such as hospitals, are also serving consumer
interests in selecting physicians and other inputs.' 3 Thus, consumers are
increasingly finding themselves in a position to bargain confidently and
effectively with providers. As a result, consumers' preferences and cost
concerns are being transmitted more effectively than ever before to the supply
side of the market.
There are numerous specific manifestations of consumers' new ability to
command providers' respect for their preferences. HMO's are now growing
impressively as a private alternative offered to workers by employers and to
10. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601, 97 Stat. 65, 149-63
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (amending title XVIII, § 1886 of the Social
Security Act, which was added by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-248, § 101(a)(1), 96 Stat. 331, 331-36 (codified as amended in scattered sections of42 U.S.C.)).
11. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2175, 95 Stat. 357, 80911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see Johns, Selective Contractingin California,
HEALTH AFF., Fall 1985, at 32.

12. Given a competitive labor market, employers will attempt to provide workers with attractive
health care plans at a reasonable cost in forgone take-home pay. See infra text accompanying notes
73, 81-82.
13. See, e.g., Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships,
1984 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1136, 1160-62.
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public beneficiaries under Medicare and state Medicaid programs. During the
1970's, such private innovation as took place tended to concentrate
excessively on HMO development and to ignore other possibilities, such as
the use of provider participation agreements and the creation of PPO's. This
occurred in part because the federal government had signaled its acceptance
of HMO's clearly enough that it seemed unlikely to undercut them in new
regulatory initiatives or in any program of national health insurance. After
the watershed events of 1979, however, the PPO concept began to take
hold.14 By permitting health insurers to discriminate for the first time in their
treatment of providers on the basis of the prices they charge or the costs they
incur, PPO mechanisms have forced traditional fee-for-service providers into
unwonted price competition. For the first time, they can expect to be pressed
for price discounts and to see patients seeking care where prices or costs are
lower. Although many elements of the private sector have yet to rethink what
they are doing and to reorganize themselves to meet the many challenges, the
tools for effective private cost containment are now widely available.
The net effect of the various policy and market developments noted here
has been to set in motion private innovation and competitive forces that are
now rapidly transforming the health care sector from a provider-controlled
monopoly, funded by a passive financing system, into a vital, cost-conscious,
competitive industry. Although it took some time to get the first olive out of
the bottle, the forces that have been unleashed are now proving powerful
indeed. The revolution remains in many ways incomplete, however, in part
because some in the private sector are still shrinking from hard choices in the
belief that either government or the system itself will choose on their behalf;
also, state regulation continues to obstruct effective competition and change
in some respects and in some places. Nevertheless, the dominant trend is
away from both the old acceptance of professional dictation and the flirtations
with governmental controls that characterized the 1970's, and it seems almost
certain that the locus of responsibility has permanently changed. Even a
swing of the political pendulum in a more liberal direction, though increasing
attention to solving the problems of the poor and uninsured,' 5 would be
unlikely to reverse the decentralization of decisionmaking authority that has
occurred.
B.

Fading Tenets of the Old Health Care

Virtually the only reference in the current malpractice debate to recent
developments in health care financing and delivery is the frequently voiced
concern that new methods of purchasing and paying for health services could,
14. PPO's take many forms but generally represent groupings of lower-cost providers to whom
insurers steer patients by offering more favorable coverage. The Medicare program has recently
required physicians to elect whether to participate in the program and accept its allowances as
payment in full. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, div. B, tit. III, 98 Stat. 494, 1061
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Previously, the program was wedded to the
idea that patients' choice of physician should be virtually unlimited.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 35-36.
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by forcing providers to economize in patient care, give rise to more
malpractice suits for departures from customary standards.' 6 This very real
and worrisome possibility is, however, only a manifestation of the deeper
conflict between current market and policy trends, on the one hand, and
received doctrines of malpractice law, on the other. As payers increasingly
bargain with providers and as consumers increasingly use price as one
criterion for their choice of care, it is becoming more and more difficult to
defend the law's assumption that there is a single correct standard of medical
7
care to which providers should be held in virtually all circumstances.'
Indeed, if some consumers are demanding economy, a strong argument can
be made for allowing a provider's legal obligations to vary so that a less costly
product can be delivered in response to that demand. Thus, it is possible to
hear complaints about the inflexibility of malpractice rules in a market
increasingly demanding cost containment as being essentially pleas for the
reintroduction in health care of the free market notion that you get what you
pay for.
The suggestion that consumer preferences, as revealed in market
transactions, may legitimately affect the quantity and quality of services
produced by health care providers is essentially the same notion that has
appeared in national health policy and that is beginning to assert itself in the
health care marketplace. Although it is generally accepted elsewhere in the
economy that a buyer's willingness to pay should determine the nature of the
goods and services he receives, this is a revolutionary idea in the health care
field. Specifically, it is at odds with the hitherto fundamental tenet that
patients are entitled to receive from health care providers not what they pay
for, but what they need-not what they demand, but what doctors believe they
should have.' This idea has been closely related in turn to the myth that, as a
technical matter, there exists one right way, discoverable in the collective
wisdom of the medical profession, to treat each medical problem. 19 A third
variation on this same general theme has been the notion that the same
standard of medical care should be available to all Americans regardless of
their ability (as distinct from their willingness) to pay. 20 Together, these three
tenets were for a long time extremely important in shaping the health care
system.
16. See, e.g., Entin, DRGs, HMOs and PPOs: Introducing Economic Issues in the Medical Malpractice
Case, 20 FORUM 674 (1985); Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1004 (1985).
17. See Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard of Care, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986,

at 265, 266-70.
18. See Boulding, The Concept of Needfor Health Services, in ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE 3
U. McKinlay ed. 1973); Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping With Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care:
The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 6, 25-30 (1975).
19. See Havighurst, Decentralizing Decision Making, supra note 1, at 29; Havighurst & Bovbjerg,
Professional Standards Review Organizations and Health Maintenance Organizations: Are The, Compatible?,

1975

UTAH

20.
CAPLAN

(1983).

L.

REV.

381, 401-06.

For a collection of ethicists' views showing strong egalitarian tendencies, see R. BAYER, A.
& N. DANIELS, IN SEARCH OF EQUITY: HEALTH CARE NEEDS AND THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
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It is beside the point being made here that the foregoing tenets were never
consistently adhered to in practice, that medical practice in fact varied widely
even without regard to financial limitations,2 1 and that the nation never came
close to realizing its oft-professed egalitarian ideal. 22 It was not the practical
validity and virtues of these tenets but their ideological and political appeal
that caused the public to accept for so long the paradigm they rationalized. A
brief review of the declining status of these three tenets-or myths-will show
that society is indeed, as has been suggested, moving away from the
traditional conception of a unitary health care system producing a single
standardized product. The relevance for the malpractice debate of the new
ideas that are asserting themselves in the health care sector will appear in the
subsequent discussion.
1. From Entitlement to Consumer Good. During the long period in which
passive third-party payers, government, and philanthropy made resources
freely available to physicians, the cultural values of the medical profession
came to define the quality of medical care solely in terms of what was (a)
technically feasible and (b) deemed by physicians to be desirable. 23 The tenet
that professionally recognized needs rather than patient-initiated demand
should govern the flow of resources to health care rested on several
assumptions: first, that patients seeking health care were ignorant of where
their welfare lay; second, that medicine was a science capable of objectively
identifying the precise diagnostic and therapeutic steps that were appropriate
in every case; and third, that practitioners and the medical profession as a
whole were guided exclusively by scientific principles and technical
considerations and could therefore be generally trusted to use resources
wisely.24 The central implication of these assumptions was that cost and the
patient's willingness to pay should not be factors in medical decisionmaking.
As consumers and their agents find themselves unable to afford the
consequences of this implication of the old dogma, the view that each patient
is entitled to receive whatever services are deemed necessary by professional
consensus is losing its hold in the new health care marketplace.
21. Consider in particular the research findings ofJohn Wennberg, M.D., in Dealingwith Medical
Practice Variations: A ProposalforAction, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6-32. Dr. Wennberg's article is
part of a recent symposium, Variations in Medical Practice, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 1
[hereinafter cited as Symposium].
22. See, e.g., L. ADAY, R. ANDERSEN & G. FLEMING, HEALTH CARE IN THE U.S.: EQUITABLE FOR
WHOM? (1980).
23. See sources cited supra notes 18-19; V. FUCHS, WHAT PRICE EQUITY? HEALTH, ECONOMICS

AND SOCIAL CHOICE 60 (1974) (noting that a physician's decisions are guided by a " 'technological
imperative'-namely, the desire. . . to do everything that he has been trained to do regardless of the
benefit-cost ratio").
24. In recognition of the loss of patient autonomy that results from assigning decisionmaking
responsibility exclusively to physicians, law and professional ethics have required providers to obtain
a patient's informed consent to risky procedures. This effort to redress the effects of denying
consumers opportunities to make choices in the marketplace did not satisfy all observers, however,
for a persistent criticism of the old health care system was that it made patients dependent and
treated them as incompetent decisionmakers. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 779-88
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
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Although the medical profession's advocacy of quality in medical care
without regard to cost appeared to reflect a sincere concern for patient
welfare, it also served providers' economic interests. Not only did the
suppression of normal economizing impulses pave the way for expansive and
demand-increasing definitions of the need for the providers' own services, but
it also allowed providers to set their fees and charges on a noncompetitive and
therefore highly lucrative basis. Whether professional values were sincere or
merely served to rationalize self-interest is not an important question. The
more significant point is that these values were aggressively used to justify a
variety of public and private actions that together helped to lock the system
25
into a mold highly advantageous to providers and costly to consumers.
Without cost as a consideration in its dealings with patients and third-party
payers, the health care industry benefited handsomely from the demand
26
expansion induced by third-party financing.
The market conditions and ideological climate fostered by the health care
establishment led providers and patients alike to view health care as an openended, standardized entitlement, and not as a market commodity that might
be purchased in a variety of forms or consumed in varying quantities
depending upon whether additional services seemed worth their cost. Under
the conventional view, any appreciable financial obstacle (besides routine
cost-sharing) placed in the way of professionally acceptable therapy was
viewed as a violation of the patient's entitlement and not as a normal
constraint helpful in ensuring that resources were put to their best uses. So
effective was the medical profession in fostering its preferred perception of
health care as a professionally defined entitlement that consumer groups and
political spokesmen came to accept it without question. Indeed, the aura
surrounding physicians and the symbolism surrounding medical care in
general were such that even private insurers and employers, who paid the
bills, shrank from challenging providers' judgments and accepted the
commitment to pay for all "medically necessary" services. Similarly, the
federal government, in undertaking to finance health care for the elderly and

the poor, also agreed to pay for any desired service that could not be shown to
25. One such restraint was the professional canon holding it unethical for a physician to engage
in "contract practice"--that is, to market his services under contract to an independent third-party
payer or other intermediary who, in effect, retailed professional services to the public. See American
Med. Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1011-16, modified and enforced, 638 F.2d 443 (2d
Cir. 1980), afd by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). Such "corporate practice of
medicine" by lay-controlled middlemen was also frequently prohibited by law, ostensibly to preserve
the physician/patient relationship and to prevent the intermediary's financial concerns from affecting
professional judgment. See, e.g., 65 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 223, 227 (1982). Similarly, the medical
profession, by political efforts and occasional coercive measures, was long able to enforce its view
that there should be no interference with patients' "free choice of provider." See M. OLSON, Foreword
to A NEw APPROACH TO THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE at 1 (1981). In addition to inhibiting the
development of closed-panel HMO's and similar arrangements, the free-choice requirement usually
meant that payers could not offer patients inducements to avoid higher-cost physicians or hospitals.
26. On the need to minimize the demand- and cost-increasing effects of moral hazard when
providing insurance coverage, see P. JosKow, CONTROLLING HOSPITAL COSTS: THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT REGULATION 20-31, 36-43 (1981). On the inhibiting effects of provider restraints on
insurer cost-containment efforts, see Havighurst, Professional Restraints, supra note 7.
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have been irresponsibly prescribed. 2 7 Spokesmen for all interests routinely
urged providers to be socially responsible, and many endorsed regulation to
limit the resources available for providers' use. Nevertheless, although these
attempts to control costs revealed certain doubts about the validity of the
assumptions underlying the dominant paradigm, they also demonstrated the
entrenchment of the entitlement mentality and policymakers' reluctance to
challenge directly the paradigm itself.
A vital feature of the medical profession's effort to maintain the view that
health care is a standardized commodity and to exclude cost considerations
from consumer and insurer calculations was the establishment of the
profession itself as the arbiter of what care was appropriately provided and
financed. In order to justify its opposition to, and to head off, efforts by
payers and other middlemen to impose their own cost controls, the profession
sponsored peer review bodies to detect abuses and resolve inevitable disputes
by reference to professional standards. 28 Insurers, anxious to avoid
physicians' displeasure, tended to accept this assertion of professional
authority, perhaps in part out of a natural disinclination to compete among
themselves in the difficult business of controlling medical practice. Similarly
anxious not to violate the entitlement principle, government, too, delegated
to profession-sponsored bodies-so-called Professional Standards Review
29
Organizations-the task of identifying the services for which it would pay.
In effect, society, implicitly accepting the premise that medical science alone
should define the scope of every citizen's entitlement to health services,
turned over to the providers of those services the task of deciding which of
them society should purchase.
Recent events have severely undermined the entitlement mentality that
guided for so long the provision, consumption, and financing of health
services. Gradually, those who pay for such services have come to appreciate
that health care is not all of one piece, that much of it is of debatable value,
that there are important trade-offs that cannot be ignored, that patients'
needs and circumstances differ, that consumer tastes for health services vary,
and that providers are inclined to attach inflated values to the services they
are asked to ration. Under the Medicare program's new policy of paying fixed
allowances for treating various conditions, providers must now adjust their
practices to the resources made available by government instead of the other
way around. Similarly, the awakening of private responsibility for health care
costs has induced the market to offer new opportunities to economize, and
purchasers, including consumers themselves, are finally beginning to face the
fact that they cannot necessarily have it all and that choices must sometimes
be made. Although consumers have begun to learn that economizing can be
27. The Medicare law committed the government to pay for all care that was "reasonable and
medically necessary." 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(!)(A) (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 28-29.
28. For instances of the use of such peer review bodies to resolve fee-related issues, see Union
Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); Iowa Dental Ass'n, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
1 21,918 (FTC Advisory Opinion, Apr. 9, 1982).
29. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 18, at 7-8.
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safe, their natural caution makes the learning curve rise only slowly over time.
Nevertheless, progress in forcing cost-containment responsibilities on private
purchasers has launched a major reevaluation of health care's marginal
benefits and stimulated the hitherto neglected search for efficiency in the use
of scarce resources.
The shift away from thinking of health care as an entitlement owes a great
deal to new recognition that the medical profession's standards are both less
uniform and less reliable than the old paradigm assumed. Recent scholarship
revealing wide and inexplicable variations in clinical practice from area to
area 30 suggests that the profession was not in fact, as the paradigm implied,
marketing a uniform product with characteristics authoritatively validated by
medical science. Instead, it appears that the profession regularly tolerated
costly practices when more economical methods might have served patients
equally well. Moreover, other health services research has raised serious
questions about the efficacy, safety, and efficiency of many practices long
sanctioned by medical custom. 3 '

In addition to these reasons for declining

faith in professional consensus, consumers have now had extensive and
generally satisfactory experience with HMO's-mechanisms that the medical
profession has long criticized and that depart in significant respects, most
notably in their propensity to hospitalize, from the standards of traditional
practitioners. 3 2 Having lost confidence in the collective prescriptions of the
medical profession, consumers are now beginning to accept the necessity for
deciding for themselves or for depending upon intermediaries other than the
medical profession to choose on their behalf. In short, they are beginning to
treat medical care less like an entitlement and more like a consumer good
and, in so doing, are weighing their new options with a view to getting good
value for their money.
2. From Entitlement to Merit Good. The old notion that health care, as defined
by the medical establishment, was an entitlement of the average citizen
carried over naturally into the proposition that, even for those who could not
afford to pay, "health care is a right." This proposition was widely heard in
the early 19 7 0's and served as the rallying cry of those who sought to
complete the movement, begun by the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid,
towards national health insurance. Even without a formal governmental
guarantee of equal access to standard medical care, however, it was widely
30. See generally Symposium, supra note 21.
31. Indeed, one noted researcher has observed that "there is reason to believe that there are
flaws in the process by which the profession generates clinical policies." Eddy, ClinicalPolicies and the
Quality of Clinical Practice, 307 NEw ENG.J. MED. 343, 343 (1982). See generallyJ. BUNKER, B. BARNES &
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believed that "two-tier medicine" was unacceptable and that a patient's
inability to pay should not affect the quality of care he could obtain. Although
this egalitarian ideal was widely violated, many hospitals were able, by
exploiting the passive payment system, to generate the funds they needed to
cross-subsidize indigent care; indeed, by this expedient they were often able
to provide very good care to nonpaying patients. It is ironic that the medical
profession, while claiming to oppose "socialized medicine," fostered and
presided over a health care system that aggressively redistributed income to
the sick poor and tended to homogenize under central authority the health
care available to the entire population.
The egalitarian ideal was also at the heart of the health policy agenda of
the 1970's.3 3 On the regulation front, centralized health planning, certificateof-need laws, and hospital rate and revenue controls were enacted or
advocated in the explicit expectation that they would ensure that all
Americans had equal access to quality care; similarly, national health
insurance plans were proposed and seriously studied throughout the period
with a view toward giving solid statutory and financial backing to the widely
recognized entitlement. Before a complete regulatory infrastructure for the
industry was in place, however, the political climate shifted, and Congress
began to lose enthusiasm for economic regulation and to recognize the
failures of similar regulation in other industries. Simultaneously, recession
and inflation reduced government's ability to finance new social programs,
and national health insurance was continually deferred, in part for this reason
but also because it was becoming increasingly doubtful that more money
spent on health programs would produce significant improvements in health.
Subtle changes in relevant political attitudes were reflected in increasingly
frequent observations that good health was a product not only of health care
but also of life style, nutrition, exercise, smoking habits, and so forth; as poor
health was seen more and more as a personal responsibility, restorative health
care was less frequently declared to be a "right."
The idea that health care, broadly and authoritatively defined, was an
entitlement of all Americans and should be distributed on an egalitarian basis
has been another casualty of recent developments. Governmental decisions
to control Medicare and Medicaid costs independently of costs in the private
sector represented a Significant break with the traditional view that public
program beneficiaries were entitled to exactly the same care that selfsupporting individuals obtained. Just as this policy change was occurring, a
prestigious presidential commission, charged with appraising ethical issues in
health policy, declared that, although all citizens should be given basic
protection, it was not ethically imperative that everyone receive identical

33. See generally Havighurst, The Debate over Health Care Cost-Containment Regulation: The Issues and
the Interests, in INCENTIVES VS. CONTROLS IN HEALTH POLICY: BROADENING THE DEBATE 9 (J. Meyer ed.
1985).
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care. 3 4 A subtle but important feature of this commission's work was that it
stressed the societal obligation to provide, rather than the individual's right to
receive, publicly financed health care. Thus, under the new paradigm that is
emerging, most rights to particular health care do not exist in the abstract but
must instead be clearly expressed in a statute or a contract before they will be
recognized in law. This new view results in large measure from the new
appreciation that health care is not a uniform good to which one can sensibly
be said to have a right but is instead a set of services of highly variable value
and content that may or may not be desirable enough in particular
circumstances to warrant embodiment in a contractual or statutory
entitlement.
The most disturbing recent development affecting the health services
available to the poor has been the erosion, through price competition, of the
provider revenues that previously allowed liberal cross-subsidization of care
for those who lacked both the ability to pay for care and eligibility for public
support. Regrettably, this development has made it necessary for
government, in a time of straitened circumstances, to seek new resources with
which to finance health services for these citizens. Although the hardships
being suffered while this search for new public funds goes on are undeniably a
result of the new, procompetitive health policy, they are most accurately
viewed as regrettable side effects-not as an intended result-of the coming
of price competition. In this respect, the problem is no different from that
arising in any newly deregulated industry and should probably be construed
here, as in those cases, merely as part of the price of strengthening incentives
for efficiency.

35

Current efforts at the state and local levels to replace with public funds the
hidden subsidies by which the old system financed indigent care make little
pretense that the object of public policy is to give the poor access to the same
mainstream care that is available to the middle class. Nevertheless, even
though access to a single uniform standard of health care seems no longer to
be generally regarded even in theory as an entitlement of all Americans,
health care in this society surely remains a merit good-that is, a commodity
that people value for others besides themselves and do not wish to see
allocated solely on the basis of ability and willingness to pay. 3 6 Even as
Americans increasingly purchase health plans and health services for their
34.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N

RESEARCH,

FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL

SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE:

THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE

AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
35. Economic regulation of transportation, communications, and other industries

has

universally had as one object, or at least one side effect, the facilitation of cross-subsidization by the
protected firms of desirable activities that the market for some reason would not support. The
introduction of competition has usually hurt the beneficiaries of these hidden subsidies. The policy
of promoting competition in health care is having similar side effects. See C. HAVIGHURST,
DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 277-85, 427-30 (1982); Havighurst, supra note 33, at 16-

19.
36.

On the concept of merit goods, see R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE,

PUBLIC FINANCE IN

THEORY AND PRACTICE 65-66 (2d ed. 1976). On the public's perception of health care as a merit
good, see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 34, at 1-6.
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own consumption in the same way that they would purchase a new car or
other consumer good, they still regard health care as something special when
it comes to providing it to those who cannot pay. Like education, basic health
care is deemed vital to ensuring equality of opportunity, and its provision to
disadvantaged citizens helps Americans believe in the basic justice of their
society.
Although some will regret the demise of the egalitarian ethic and many will
fear that the majority will provide inadequately for the disadvantaged
minority, it is doubtful that Americans, with their new sophistication
concerning the value of marginal health care, will return to the naive view that
everyone is entitled to some centrally defined quantum and quality of health
services. Instead, with their new perception of health care as a merit good
rather than a standardized entitlement, policymakers will concentrate their
attention on deciding what particular services are truly in the merit good
category. 37 In time, a new entitlement, either to particular services or to a
fixed dollar subsidy (that is, a "voucher") that an individual can use to enroll
in a private health plan, is likely to emerge as a way of honoring society's
commitment to guarantee basic health services to all.
III
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENHANCING CONSUMER WELFARE THROUGH
PRIVATELY NEGOTIATED TORT REFORMS

The changing public policies, market conditions, and perceptions reported
above reveal that Americans are increasingly comfortable with the notion that,
even in purchasing a professional service as complex and vital as health care,
consumers can make choices, that economizing choices can be rational, that
different people may elect to purchase different things, and that society need
not rely solely upon professional consensus or government to define what
patients are entitled to receive. Even though the revolution in ways of
purchasing and thinking about health care is far from complete (certainly
there is no shortage of rhetoric expressing the old views), the decentralization
of decisionmaking is now far enough advanced in practice 38 to reveal both

fundamental

problems

in

the

law

of medical

malpractice

and new

37. For a debate over the decline of the entitlement view, see Blumstein, Rationing Medical
Resources: A Constitutional,Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1345 (1981); Rosenblatt, Rationing
"Normal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (1981); Blumstein, Distingui.hing
Government's Responsibility in Rationing Public and Private Medical Resources, 60 TEX. L. REV. 899 (1982);
Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care Through Market Mechanisms: A Response to Professor Blumstein,
60 TEX. L. REV. 919 (1982).
38. Measuring the progress of a revolution is difficult, but one opinion pollster concludes as
follows:
Historians looking back on the 1980s will report that the nation's health care system was
profoundly changed during this decade. They will note . . . increasing competition among
health care providers; fundamental changes in delivery of health care services and in the
institutions that deliver them; and a revolution in the way that health care services are sold and
paid for. They may also be able to note that-after years of escalating health care costs-private
sector costs were brought under control. And, if they are perceptive, they will report that the
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opportunities for solving those problems by private contract. Malpractice law
can now be seen as a factor raising the cost of medical care both by
compelling patients to pay for protection they may not need and by inhibiting
desirable economizing in medical practice. In addition, in a market which has
seen other kinds of economizing and in which consumers have both
sophisticated allies looking out for their interests and a range of real
alternatives, it should be possible to view contractual modifications of
consumers' tort rights as further efforts to enhance consumer welfare. Just as
consumers are coming gradually to realize that there is more than one right
way to organize the financing and delivery of health services and often more
than one acceptable way to treat particular medical conditions, they may
eventually appreciate that the legal system does not have a monopoly on
wisdom when it comes to devising liability rules and incentive systems.
A.

Why Private Malpractice Reform May Be Desirable

The next step in the argument here is to show more precisely why private
reforms might be desired by the parties to particular health care
transactions-not only by providers seeking to limit their liability exposure
but also by consumers who stand to lose their chance at a big tort award.
Reduction of the high cost of operating the current reparations system is
perhaps the most obvious source of benefits from modifications of the rules
governing liability for medical injuries. Upwards of sixty percent of what
providers pay into the system (and must build into their charges to
consumers) goes to pay administrative costs, particularly attorney fees. 39 A
consumer might be forgiven for concluding that this costly liability system is
not maintained primarily for his benefit. Even if he does not distrust the
motives of those designing that system, he might judge that his own insurance
coverage supplies all the financial protection he needs and thus justifies his
declining some or even all of the tort system's duplicative protection. He
might also conclude that malpractice law, while extravagantly compensating a
few patients, protects against only a small subset of the many risks that
patients face-namely, those injuries that result from provable negligence. In
order to benefit from the system at all, the injured patient must be willing to
put his fate in a lawyer's hands, to challenge publicly the professional
competence of the health care providers who took care of him, to undergo the
emotional and other burdens of drawn-out litigation, and to await, perhaps
for years, a highly uncertain outcome. Given a chance to opt out, consumers
public's behavior, attitudes, and expectations about health care providers also shifted
dramatically.
Some things have not changed, including our priorities. Americans want a health care system
that provides first-rate care with a human face, that is accessible to everyone, including the old
and the poor, and that is affordable.
Taylor, Healing the Health Care System, PUB. OPINION, Aug./Sept. 1985, at 16. It seems likely that
changes in behavior precede changes in attitudes expressed to pollsters.
39. See P. DANZON, supra note i, at 186; see also O'Connell, An Alternative, supra note 1, at 503-10
(estimating that only 28% of the premium dollar goes finally to patients).
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might well elect not to pay the fee necessary to enter this costly and
potentially trying game of chance.
Of course, the tort system does not exist solely to ensure compensation for
grievous injury, and patients will not fail to perceive that the greater value of
the system to them may lie in its in terrorem effect on providers. 40 Although
the discretionary right to register a grievance by suing a physician or hospital
will be valued more by some consumers than by others, all should see its
possible utility in inducing a provider's best efforts, not only to avoid a bad
outcome (or at least actionable negligence), but also to earn the patient's
loyalty so that an injury is less likely to trigger a lawsuit. 4 ' Experts differ,
however, on the incentive effects of tort law. Indeed, few besides plaintiffs'
lawyers regard the existing malpractice system as an ideal mechanism for
deterring injuries. 42 For one thing, liability insurance spares a provider from
feeling the financial consequences of a claim directly, leaving as the main
(although perhaps unreliable) sanctions the stigma, publicity, and emotional
pain of facing a charge of professional incompetence. Some consumers might
judge that the incentives supplied by the tort system are not needed to ensure
the quality of the care they receive in a particular setting, believing, for
example, that the peer review mechanisms operating in a given hospital,
HMO, or other organized practice setting provide adequate correctives and
disincentives for poor practice. Alternatively, they might decide that,
although it is wiser to reserve their right to sue, some modification of their
legally prescribed rights, some reduction in their potential financial recovery,
or some change in factfinding procedures would provide appropriate
incentives at a more reasonable cost.
Consumers and their representatives might also recognize that tort law,
while possibly deterring some negligence, may also have perverse incentive
effects. Assertions that the legal system compels the practice of "defensive
medicine" are difficult to evaluate definitively, 43 but it is plausible that the
40. On the need for preserving tort remedies to deter bad medical practice and bad outcomes,
see P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 9-17; Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence, 298 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1282 (1978). The leading exposition of the view that tort law should seek to achieve
economic efficiency by minimizing not the cost of accidents but the total of the costs of accidents and
accident avoidance is G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970).
41. Consumers may value their right to sue precisely because it assures them that their welfare
will not be neglected and that it enhances the respect they receive from the other party to any
transaction. It is widely noted that patients who are treated decently are less likely to sue in the event
of mishap.
42. Though she advocates deterrence, Danzon also advocates substantial reforms of malpractice
law to improve its contribution to efficient provider performance. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 17.
Others believe that deterrence is greatly overrated as a justification for personal injury litigation. See,
e.g., Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 559-91 (1985).
43. Several contributors to this symposium show how inconclusive discussions of defensive
medicine necessarily must be: Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice on Trial: Quality of Care is the Important
Standard, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 321; Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical
MalpracticeRisks Between Patients and Providers, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173, 175-80;
Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, Information on Malpractice: A Review of EmpiricalResearch on Major Policy
Issues, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 85, 106-09.
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cost of medical care is raised unnecessarily by providers' efforts to make
themselves look good in the event of a subsequent lawsuit. Moreover, the
easy availability of third-party payment has long made it possible for providers
to spend freely on tests and extra services that served more to protect
themselves against perceived legal risks than to protect patients against bad
medical results. To the extent that such excessive spending became standard
practice, it was risky for any provider to omit the defensive measure, because
any departure from medical custom was likely to be judged negligence under
44
the usual legal tests.

The tort system's contribution to misallocation of resources in the health
care sector results from more than the pressure it puts on providers to adopt
practices that physicians recognize as being more defensive than useful.
Malpractice law tends to presume that customary practice, because it reflects
professional consensus, is necessarily good practice. 4 5 To the extent that
customary practice develops in a system lacking significant cost constraints,
however, it may be highly inefficient. In ignoring this possibility, the law has
not only encouraged inefficient defensive medicine, but it has also embraced
the old idea that cost is no object, that anything arguably beneficial to the
patient should be done. Thus, malpractice doctrine embodies the
presumption that there is one correct standard of medical care, that this
standard is discoverable in medical consensus, and that all patients are
entitled to enjoy care meeting this centrally defined standard. In short, the
law manifests all the premises of the old, unitary health care system and
stands as one of its last remaining bulwarks. As the old paradigm weakens in
practice, however, consumers and their representatives, seeking greater
efficiency in the provision of health care, might reasonably seek to relieve
providers of the tort system's compulsion to practice defensively and
according to costly, unverified professional standards.
The deficiencies of the existing tort system are inviting close legislative
attention at the moment, just as they did in the 1970's.46 Reforms are likely to
be slow in coming, however, in part because legislators are naturally reluctant
to deprive patients of their basic right to seek redress from providers for the
harms they do. Even though this basic right is not overwhelmingly valuable to
44. See Havighurst, supra note 17, at 266-70.
45. See id. In Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), the court refused to accept
adherence to custom as a defense and imposed a standard of its own devising on ophthalmologists.
A similar willingness to second-guess medical standards is reflected in cases doing away with the socalled locality rule and holding local practitioners to higher standards prevailing in other places. See,
e.g., Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970). The point to be made here is that
customary practice may be more demanding, not less demanding, than responsible use of resources
requires. It is a telling commentary on the judicial performance in the Helling case that medical
research taking all relevant factors into account provides no convincing evidence for the costeffectiveness of even the customary practice of screening all patients over age 40 for glaucoma. See
Eddy, Sanders & Eddy, The Value of Screeningfor Glaucoma with Tonometry, 28 SURV. OPHTHALMOLOGY
194, 201 (1983). The Washington court, which held on the basis of its own intuition that it was
negligence not to screen the plaintiff because she was under 40, is thus left with egg on its face.
46. See Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1986, at 5.
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a matter of great political significance-the

distribution of power in the physician/patient relationship. The issue of
patient rights therefore has greater salience and impact than cost
considerations in the political debate. Because it is always providers who raise
the cost issue and because they bear the system's costs in the first instance in
the form of insurance premiums, providers naturally appear to be the sole
beneficiaries of any legislative modification of patients' remedies. Unlike
consumers negotiating with providers over price and the precise terms of
their future relationship, legislators and their constituents do not see clearly
the cost savings that consumers may enjoy as a result of legal changes
reducing provider costs. Instead, legislators view themselves as being asked
to take from consumers and give to providers. Under these conditions, they
47
may make only minimal reforms.
The political difficulty of legislating malpractice reforms should not be
taken as a sign that a legislature believes that the legal system has found the
single best way to allocate the risk of patient injuries. Legislative inaction-or
action, as the case may be-is equally consistent with the idea that there is no
one right way to define provider/patient relationships but that patients should
be presumed, in the absence of a contrary provision in an explicit contract, to
have certain basic rights to legal redress. There is thus nothing in a
legislature's definition of an implied contract between provider and patient
that should preclude patients from waiving their legally conferred rights in
particular instances in return for explicit or implicit concessions by providers.
If patients do not value their potential tort rights highly and providers wish
strongly for relief from the law's burdens, there is ample room for a mutually
beneficial reallocation of risks. It is perhaps most helpful to think of the tort
system maintained under the legslature's auspices simply as a starting point
for negotiations, one that arms consumers with substantial bargaining power
48
with which to negotiate for price reductions or other benefits.
47. There should be no implication, such as Professor Atiyah draws, from the proposal to
encourage private reforms that legislative reforms should not also be pursued. See Atiyah, Medical
Malpractice and the Contract/Tort Boundary, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 287, 300.
Professor Atiyah properly couples his preference for legislative or judicially imposed reforms with a
recognition of the difficulty, especially in the American system, of achieving major improvements by
this route. Indeed, given his preference for centrally imposed rules, his concession "at the end of the
day" that the private reform option is better than no alternative at all, id. at 302, is a striking one.
48. This conception shows why advocacy of greater judicial receptivity to private reforms does
not amount, as Atiyah suggests, to a proposal "to shift the control of much of the physician/patient
relationship from tort to contract." Id. at 287. Instead, the objective is simply to provide a kind of
safety valve by which parties can, if they choose, opt out of the tort system.
The great insight of Ronald Coase in his classic article, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J. LAw & ECON.
1 (1960), was that tort rules affect the allocation of resources only because parties whose interests
conflict cannot costlessly negotiate with each other to ensure the least-cost solution. In the real
world of limited information and high transaction costs, there would appear to be good efficiency
reasons to make health care providers bear the risk of accidents because they are likely to be, in
Calabresi's phrase, the "cheapest cost avoiders"--that is, to be in the best position to assess and
reduce particular risks. G. CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 135-73. Nevertheless, a legal rule prohibiting
explicit contracts shifting or redefining this risk-in effect making transaction costs infinite-would
appear to destroy important opportunities for increasing efficiency still further. The problem is
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B: Some Specific Suggestions for Private Reform
There are many kinds of contractual modifications of tort rights that might
make sense both to particular consumers and to the providers with whom they
contract for future services. Some would relate only to the factfinding and
faultfinding processes employed. 4 9 Arbitration clauses may reduce litigation
costs, improve the quality and consistency of decisions, increase the ease and
speed with which claims may be brought and disposed of, and limit the
publicity and offensive adversariness that providers and some patients find so
distasteful in the present system. It is possible that other arrangements for
screening out nonmeritorious claims could also be stipulated by contract.
Providers and patients might also agree on the allocation of legal costs,
50
perhaps providing that the loser in any litigation would pay all attorney fees.
Another reasonable way to modify tort remedies would be to limit the size
of recoveries. 5 1 Private contracts might preclude or limit recovery for pain

and suffering, mental distress, and other noneconomic loss in some or all
cases or provide for the exclusion from awards of amounts that duplicate
benefits available to the patient from certain collateral sources, such as health
or disability insurance. Because consumers do not customarily purchase
insurance protection against other than out-of-pocket losses, they appear to
attach only low value to the duplicative or excessive protection provided by
the tort system. As noted above, however, they might also be cautious about
removing incentives for providers to render high-quality or more
personalized, attentive care.
Rational patients might also agree to changes in the substantive
obligations of providers, substituting a contractual standard of care for the
common law standard of care applicable in a suit for damages. 52 A primary

objective of redefining the expected standard of performance would be to
improve the climate for efficient behavior by eliminating pressures to practice
unnecessary defensive medicine and to adhere to inefficient professional
standards. For example, state tort doctrine binding an HMO to adhere to
community practice standards might be expressly declared inapplicable to the
HMO's physicians in order to facilitate responsible economizing that the

HMO could otherwise undertake only at the risk of having to pay for every
unsatisfactory outcome that might occur. Moreover, because patients may
especially acute where, as in medical care, the strict liability approach is unfeasible and the cost of
shifting particular losses (those caused by negligence) is therefore particularly high.
49. See Henderson, Agreements Changing the Forumfor Resolving Malpractice Claims, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1986, at 243.
50. FLA. STAT. § 768.56 (1985) makes limited statutory provision for such fee shifting, which
may discourage the bringing of nonmeritorious suits, encourage prompter settlements, and reduce
overall costs by giving each party a potential stake in limiting the other's legal expenses. Unlike the
Florida law, the parties' contract might provide that a plaintiffs attorney taking a case on contingency
would assume the plaintiffs potential obligation for the defendant's legal costs. See generally Attorney
Fee Shifting, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984.
51. See Ginsburg, Kahn, Thornhill & Gambardella, Contractual Revisions to Medical Malpractice
Liability, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 253, 258-59, 262-63.
52. See Havighurst, supra note 17.
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place a low value on their right to go to court over all mishaps that a jury
might be persuaded to treat as resulting from legal fault, a provider/patient
53
contract might reasonably preclude lawsuits for all but gross negligence.
Yet another approach might be to use fewer dollars to pay lawyers' fees
and extravagant awards to a few patients and more dollars to compensate
patients' real out-of-pocket losses. This reallocation could be accomplished
by removing fault as the criterion of compensability and committing the
provider to pay basic benefits for particular injuries, however they occur. 54 In
some ways, the substitution of such no-fault compensation for tort rights
could improve provider incentives to achieve good medical results.
Moreover, patients might be willing to pay more for the more rational and
55
extensive financial protection that a no-fault scheme could provide.
The foregoing suggestions for private reform of the tort rules governing
medical injuries speak for themselves. Indeed, several of the ideas suggested
for private implementation have already been adopted in some form by state
legislatures. 56 Others have been proposed for legislative action, 5 7 and a
persuasive argument can be made that each of them represents an
improvement over the prevailing system, even when viewed exclusively from

the standpoint of the consumer. (Obviously, it is wholly inappropriate to view
the matter ex post rather than ex ante-that is, to judge effects on patient
welfare after rather than before the occurrence of a regrettable event.) The
fact that health care providers would also benefit from such voluntary reforms
is simply a particularly vivid demonstration of the principle that private
contracts are not a zero-sum game, in which one party can gain only at the

expense of the other. Here, both consumers and providers can gain
materially from voluntary revisions of the implied contract that the law
supplies to govern their relationship when they have not themselves spelled
out its terms. Although trial lawyers may be injured by the parties' voluntary
adoption of arrangements that economize on the need for legal services, the
public should not grieve for them. One hopes, of course, that legislators and
judges, as denizens of the legal culture that produced the current tort rules,
do not feel compelled to defend the system that has treated the trial lawyers
58
so well-and consumers and providers so badly.
53. See id. at 272-75.
54. See Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault Alternative, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 277.
55. An attractive approach would be for the provider to offer the patient a chance to purchase
(perhaps at a provider-subsidized price) insurance against the risks of, say, a particular
hospitalization. Such coverage might be conditioned on a waiver of tort rights or at least on an
agreement that any proceeds would be excluded from any tort award. Many variations of this
approach, which can be likened to "flight insurance," can be imagined.
56. See Robinson, supra note 46, at 23-26.
57. See id. at 32-35.
58. Professor Atiyah is correct in his perception that renewed emphasis on private contracting is
being advocated to bring about specific reforms or at least to open the door to such reforms if people
choose to adopt them. See Atiyah, supra note 47, at 298-300. More precisely, the proposal reflects a
concern that the legal system embodies out-of-date conceptions and imposes severe burdens that
could be alleviated by do-it-yourself reforms.
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IV
5
LEGAL OBSTACLES TO PRIVATE REFORMS

9

Although there is only sparse legal authority on the enforceability of
contractual modifications of patients' malpractice rights, most lawyers would
be inclined to doubt the courts' willingness to accept such provisions at face
value and to hold that an injured patient had surrendered any right conferred
upon him by the legal system. This skepticism concerning the enforceability
of contracts derogating from consumers' tort rights reflects values and biases
deeply embedded in the legal system, which frequently tends to view
consumer contracts more as candidates for close judicial scrutiny and
rewriting than as presumptively valid definitions of private rights and
responsibilities. Although the broader implications of the legal system's
hostility to contractual reallocations of risks will not be pursued here, the
reader is invited to consider them. 6 0 It will be suggested at the end of this
discussion that the legal system's lack of enthusiasm for consumer decisions
to economize on legal services betrays the same kind of professional hubris
and self-aggrandizement that caused the medical profession for so long to
deny the legitimacy of cost-conscious consumer choice in the medical field.
There are several signs of judicial reluctance to allow patients to waive
their malpractice rights. One particularly suggestive case is Emory University v.
Porubiansky,6 1 in which the Georgia Supreme Court refused to enforce an
exculpatory clause signed by a patient patronizing a low-cost university dental
clinic. The court's theory was not that the patient had been misled or that the
clinic had overreached in some way but that the exculpatory clause violated
public policy as expressed in a statute contemplating tort actions in the event
of a professional's failure to exercise " 'a reasonable degree of care and
skill.' "62 A number of decisions in other states have also invalidated waivers
59. Several paragraphs in the following discussion are adapted, with the permission of the
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, from Havighurst, Decentralized Decision
Making, supra note 1,at 35-37.
60. See Robinson, supra note 43, at 183-89; Atiyah, supra note 47, at 288-91. The latter reference
cites literature advocating aggressive judicial imposition of "community values" and redistributive
preferences in adjudicating private contractual disputes. Id. at 290 nn.15-18. There is a strong
authoritarian streak in many of the scholars who would encouragejudges to substitute their own view
of what is right and fair for the rights and duties that the parties have privately agreed upon.
Nevertheless, there are many instances in which contracts fail to reveal the parties' intent. In these
cases some exercise ofjudicial discretion is unavoidable, and it is reasonable for it to be exercised by
leaning toward the less powerful party. As in all disputes over judicial activism, the issue is one of
degree-how quickly should courts conclude either that the parties were unclear or that the contract
was unconscionable, adhesive, or unfairly negotiated and that therefore their own rather than the
parties' preferences should govern. The point to be made here is simply that, when parties expressly
and openly agree to a different set of rules governing medical injuries, the presumption should be in
favor of and not against giving effect to the agreement. See id. at 291 n.2 1, (quoting and discussing C.
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 60 (1981)).
61. 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981); see also Smith v. Hospital Auth., 160 Ga. App. 387, 287
S.E.2d 99 (1981).
62. Emory University, 248 Ga. at 393, 282 S.E.2d at 904 (quoting GA. CODE § 84-924 (1979)
(current version at GA. CODE § 51-1-27 (1982))).
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PROBLEMS

of tort rights against health care professionals. 63 All of these cases, however,
involved attempts to shift all or virtually all of the risk of defendants'
carelessness to patients. It is therefore arguable that they should not control
the outcome of a case in which something substantially less than complete
immunity is sought. In addition, these cases may also be distinguishable from
cases emerging in the new health care marketplace on the ground that they all
involved waivers by individual patients contracting with, and possibly being
overreached by, powerful providers rather than arrangements negotiated on
consumers' behalf by sophisticated employers or insurers.
In a few states, there may be statutes, such as Georgia's, that could lead a
court to conclude that the legal system's rules are mandatory rather than
merely prescriptions applicable in the absence of a contrary agreement
between the parties. Illinois, for example, has a statutory section bearing the
ungrammatical title, "Releases from liability .

.

. is [sic] against public

policy." 64 The coverage of other statutes may seem so all-encompassing and
prescriptive as to invite the holding that their terms cannot be expressly
overridden by private action. 65 Nevertheless, carefully drawn agreements
may be seen as involving something less than a "release" under the Illinois
statute, as affecting only the patient's remedies and not a publicly protected
right, or as fleshing out statutory policy and terminology, such as Georgia's
reference to "a reasonable degree of care and skill."' 6 6 If the parties appear to
have used statutory policy as a point of departure and not to have violated the
spirit of the statute, courts should not strike down their election to modify
certain rights and responsibilities. Although legislation should usually not be
essential to open the private pathway to malpractice reform, a legislature
might be well advised to clear up any doubt by stating expressly that its
prescriptions are not intended to preclude enforcement of inconsistent
67
private agreements.
Although existing law does not generally preclude responsible private
modifications of malpractice rights, a court asked to rectify a hardship
encountered by some individual plaintiff as a result of surrendering some
legal right will not be easily convinced that the individual voluntarily assumed
63. See, e.g., Tatham v. Hoke, 469 F. Supp. 914 (W.D.N.C. 1979), aftd, 622 F.2d 584 (4th Cir.
1980); Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963);
Meiman v. Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1969); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429
(Tenn. 1977). For additional references, see Ginsburg, Kahn, Thornhill & Gambardella, supra note
51, at 253-54.
64. Public Act No. 82-280 § 19a-102, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11, § 4478 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
65. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.45 (1983) (commencing with the words "In any action").
66. GA. CODE § 51-1-27 (1982); see supra text accompanying note 62.
67. Legislation should not try to specify too much. The best approach might be simply to
declare (1) that, except perhaps for pure exculpatory clauses, private agreements altering rights,
remedies, and responsibilities of providers and patients should not be held unenforceable on the
ground that they are against public policy and (2) that, even if such an agreement is found in a
contract of adhesion, it will nevertheless be enforced unless the court is satisfied that, taking the
agreement as a whole, it is unconscionable. The important thing is for the legislature to make clear,
first, that it does not regard itself and the courts as the sole sources of wisdom on how medical
injuries should be handled and, second, that the courts' supervisory role should be limited to
preventing overreaching by providers in favorable bargaining circumstances.
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that particular risk. In no jurisdiction would contractual provisions be
conclusive, particularly if bargaining power was arguably unequal, if
disclosure was arguably incomplete, or if no other option was offered or
readily available to the patient. As a result, providers not only must be careful
to define and limit their obligations clearly but also must be prepared to
demonstrate that the contracting process gave adequate assurance that the
bargain struck accommodated the interests of both parties. Although broad
waivers of liability-exculpatory clauses-may well be too much for most
courts to swallow, 68 less sweeping and less seemingly one-sided departures

from the dictates of the tort system should be defensible if steps are carefully
taken and a proper record is made.
Unfortunately, the foregoing conclusion is not very secure because of a
lack of legal precedents. Moreover, lawyers' nervousness is heightened by
recent decisions in which several state courts invalidated legislative reforms
adopted in response to the malpractice crisis of the 1970's.69 Although many
reforms were approved, some courts did not hesitate to second-guess
legislative judgments under state constitutional principles, and it is natural to
view these decisions as signs of judicial hostility to all revisions of patients'
tort rights. Nevertheless, the constitutional role of courts in reviewing
legislation differs fundamentally from their role in enforcing private
contracts. 70 Thus, decisions holding that legislatures lacked a constitutionally
acceptable basis for taking away malpractice plaintiffs' rights manifestly do not
govern instances where patients arguably surrendered those same or similar
rights voluntarily. Quite a different set of legal doctrines governs in cases of
the latter type, and the following discussion of these doctrines indicates that
private argreements meeting reasonable requirements stand a fair chance of
being upheld.
There are several theories under which courts would evaluate contractual
provisions that derogate in some respect from the patient's right to recover
for medical malpractice. The initial inquiry is likely to be to determine
whether the contract in question is a "contract of adhesion"-that is, an
68. But see the provocative defense of such clauses in Robinson, supra note 43, at 184-97.
69. Doran v. Priddy, 534 F. Supp. 30 (D. Kan. 1981) (reinstating the collateral source rule);
Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (invalidating screening panel requirement); Wright v.
Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 11. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (invalidating pretrial hearing
panel, maximum recovery limit); State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583
S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (invalidating screening panel requirement); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925,
424 A.2d 825 (1980) (reinstating the collateral source rule); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125
(N.D. 1978) (invalidating entire reform act); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d
164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1976) (invalidating maximum recovery); Detar Hosp., Inc. v.
Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App. 1985) (invalidating maximum recovery); State ex ,el. Strykowski
v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978) (invalidating provision for structured payments).
70. Some courts have made the constitutionality of malpractice reform legislation under equal
protection requirements turn on the existence of a true "crisis" warranting special legislative
attention to that area (without also addressing other areas of tort law). E.g., Jones v. State Bd. of'
Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). Although the legal
issue is quite different, a court might more readily enforce a contract altering a plaintiffs tort rights if
it were affirmatively convinced that malpractice law as currently constituted and administered does
not always serve consumer interests well.
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agreement imposed on a patient under circumstances limiting the patient's
opportunity to bargain for a different arrangement or to choose an alternative
provider. 7 ' Although an adhesion contract may be enforced, a court can be
expected to take special pains to assure itself that the terms of the contract
were equitable. Moreover, even if a contract is not an adhesion contract, a
court may still refuse to enforce a term that it finds unconscionable 72 or that
violates public policy in some respect. As noted above, blanket exculpatory
clauses have been found to be inconsistent with general public policy toward
professionals and thus held unenforceable regardless of whether the contracts
containing them were adhesive. Courts are less likely to use these doctrines
to invalidate a contract term, however, if they are satisfied by all the
circumstances that the agreement was arrived at fairly.
Some help in identifying adhesion contracts comes from a series of
California cases involving the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate future
medical malpractice claims. 73 Though notoriously plaintiff-oriented, the
California Supreme Court has required malpractice plaintiffs lacking actual
knowledge of the arbitration clause to submit to unwanted arbitration in
accordance with their HMO subscriber contracts. The leading case is Madden
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.74 In that case, the state, acting as the plaintiff's
employer, had agreed to the arbitration clause, and the plaintiff had selected
the HMO from a menu of alternative plans, including some that did not
require arbitration. The court upheld the clause, finding that the contract was
not one of adhesion and that the state had implied authority as the plaintiffs
agent to agree to the clause in question. In other cases, California courts have
refused to enforce arbitration clauses because of differences in the bargaining
circumstances. 7 5 In one such case, the court refused enforcement because of
the one-sided nature of the clause, which bound only the subscriber to
arbitrate.76

71. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963) (exculpatory clause not enforced); Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 357-67,
133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 781-91 (1976) (arbitration agreement not enforced); Obstetrics & Gynecologists
v. Pepper, Nev. -,
693 P.2d 1259 (1985) (arbitration agreement not enforced); see also
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
72. The doctrine of unconscionability allows a court wide discretion in deciding whether it can
in good conscience enforce a contract term. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981);
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978). Such "substantive unconscionability" has been contrasted with "procedural
unconscionability," which involves defects in the bargaining process similar to those leading to
characterization of a contract as a contract of adhesion. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 81-82. On the subject of medical malpractice arbitration
agreements, see generally Henderson, ContractualProblems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate
Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REV. 947 (1972); Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Time for a Model
Act, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 454 (1981).
74. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976).
75. See, e.g., Wheeler v. St.Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 357-69, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 78391 (1976). For a recent Nevada case, see Obstetrics & Gynecologists v. Pepper, Nev. -,
693
P.2d 1259 (1985).
76. Beynon v. Garden Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1980).
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Although the Madden decision allowed the parties to alter an important
feature of the tort system by contract, a future plaintiff could easily distinguish
that case from one involving an attempted alteration of substantive rights.
The court's decision rested firmly on the public policy favoring the use of
arbitration to resolve disputes, a policy based on efficiency considerations.
Thus, unless a future court could be independently persuaded of the possible
desirability of substituting a different measure of damages, a different
standard of care, or a different definition of compensable events for judicially
set standards, it might refuse to enforce the contractual modification. Indeed,
the court in Madden emphasized that the arbitration clause "does not detract
from Kaiser's duty to use reasonable care in treating patients, nor limit its
liability for breach of this duty, but merely substitutes one forum for
another." ' 77 Despite this technical distinction, however, an arbitration clause
can affect substantive outcomes and cannot be entirely differentiated from
other contractual modifications of the parties' rights and duties. Thus, the
willingness of courts to enforce arbitration clauses indicates some prospect
78
that other agreements would be enforced.
In upholding the arbitration clause in Madden, the court emphasized that,
in addition to bearing "equally on Kaiser and the members," it benefited the
latter by "facilitat[ing] the adjudication of minor malpractice claims which
cannot economically be resolved in a judicial forum." '7 9 A court looking for
comparable mutuality of benefit in each discrete provision of a contract would
be troubled by the seeming one-sidedness of provisions altering substantive
tort rights. Indeed, unless it was willing to assume, on the basis of satisfactory
bargaining circumstances, that the patients had received compensating
benefits in the form of a reduced price or otherwise, such a court would
inevitably refuse to enforce any significant modification of judicially set
standards. Nevertheless, such judicial paternalism might be tempered upon a
showing that the contracting process gave consumers adequate opportunities
to protect themselves. In any event, many courts are less paternalistic than
California's and should be willing to accept the presumptive validity of private
agreements. On the other hand, providers concerned that judges will insist
upon demonstrable mutuality might feel that their best bet for obtaining relief

77. 17 Cal. 3d at 711, 552 P.2d at 1186, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 890; see also Doyle v. Giuliucci, 62 Cal.
2d 606, 401 P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965) (enforcing HMO arbitration clause).
78. It must be acknowledged, however, that Madden is narrowly interpreted by the California
courts and by federal courts applying California law. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 447-49 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (rejecting argument that Madden undercuts the
rule that ambiguities in health insurance policies are resolved against the insurer); Fields v. Blue
Shield, 163 Cal. App. 3d 570, 580-83, 209 Cal. Rptr. 781, 786-88 (1985) (viewing Madden as a threat
to "long-established public policy principles in this state aimed at protection of the general public
against highly refined legalistic [insurance policies] carefully designed for the benefit of the
insurer"); Beynon v. Garden Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 705-09, 161 Cal. Rptr.
146, 149-52 (1980) (rejecting Madden as authority for an alleged agent to negotiate an especially
burdensome arbitration clause).
79. 17 Cal. 3d at 712, 552 P.2d at 1186, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
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lies in offering an explicit quid pro quo in the form of an alternative injury
compensation system based on no-fault principles.8 0
Because the plaintiff in Madden had the protection of both his employer's
representation of his interests and an opportunity to reject the HMO, it might
be asked whether the absence of either of these two forms of protection-a
sophisticated agent and individual choice-would change the result. This is
an important question, since different arrangements found in the health care
marketplace locate the responsibility for choice in different places. The most
common pattern, however, is the one most in keeping with the Madden case.
Under this model, the employer merely offers employees "multiple choice"
among several plans that it initially selects. By allowing the individual
employee to make, and benefit from, the final economizing choice, the
employer avoids the charge that it shortchanged the workers for its own
benefit."' Although courts should probably accept the consequences of an
economizing decision made by either the consumer himself or someone
representing his interests, 8 2 the closer one could come to the Madden
paradigm the better the prospect that a contractual innovation would be
enforced.
Insurance law also supports the impression that contracts modifying tort
rights will be judicially enforced if the bargaining circumstances seem fair.
Because insurance policies have all the earmarks of adhesion contracts, the
law of insurance reflects extreme judicial reluctance to enforce contractual
fine print.8 3 Nevertheless, courts are most apt to rewrite a policy to protect a
consumer from hardship when the coverage excluded by the policy was not
available to the insured from another source. 84 If the insured had the
opportunity to elect the broader coverage, it will be hard for him to persuade
the court to invoke the insurance law doctrine of "reasonable expectations" to
override the policy language. There would appear to be a close analogy to the
case of a consumer who had and passed up an opportunity to select a health
care plan that left tort rights intact.
The foregoing legal analysis points toward a rule that might uphold a
contractual reallocation of injury risks if it was adopted in an employerstructured multiple-choice setting but not if it resulted from the interaction of
an individual patient and an individual provider. Unfortunately, such a rule
could be seen as discriminating unfairly against practitioners and hospitals
who continue to attract patients on an individual basis.8 5 Not only would such
80.

See generally Tancredi, supra note 54.

81.

See C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 35, at 409-16.

82. See generally Robinson, supra note 43.
83. See Abraham,Judge-Made Law andJudge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of
the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981); see also McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F.
Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Fields v. Blue Shield, 163 Cal. App. 3d 570, 209 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1985).
84. Abraham, supra note 83, at 1155.
85. Perhaps the PPO concept can be adapted to let a subset of fee-for-service providers in a
community effectively and fairly offer their services on terms including a narrowing of patients'
malpractice rights. Indeed, one can imagine a PPO organizer using relief from malpractice risks as
an inducement to get providers to join in offering their services for a lower price.
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a rule effectively deny such traditional providers an equal opportunity to offer
patients attractive alternatives to the existing tort regime, but it would leave
them with little room to economize by departing from customary practice and
perhaps also with a disproportionate share of potentially litigious patients. 8 6
There is an unfortunate irony here. One of the strengths of traditional feefor-service medical practice is that it fosters individual choice of provider and
highly personal physician/patient relationships. Yet the law, perceiving an
imbalance of bargaining power in such relationships, creates protections that
have the effect of forcing patients into making choices collectively s 7 and into
receiving care in more bureaucratic settings. It would be unfortunate if
judicial hostility to individual choice of liability rules should create an artificial
competitive advantage for those health plans, such as HMO's, that sacrifice
desirable opportunities for individual choice of other kinds. Perhaps the best
that can be hoped for is that individual fee-for-service practitioners will
eventually be allowed to contract with patients for liability regimes
comparable to those that their HMO competitors have been able to adopt in a
competitive market with limited judicial oversight.8 8
Another regrettable consequence of a legal rule barring contractual
limitations of tort rights in particular bargaining circumstances might be to
deprive some patients of appropriate care altogether. In a few places-such
as rural North Carolina and Molokai, Hawaii-increases in liability insurance
premiums have recently caused general practitioners to forego delivering
babies, forcing patients to travel long distances for obstetrical services. If
private agreements limiting tort rights are unenforceable if entered into by
individual patients lacking the alternative of receiving care under customary
rules, a possible solution to this problem is precluded. Perhaps an innovative
insurer will offer a policy permitting a physician to offer a patient the option
of retaining her full tort rights by paying an additional fee equal to the
insurer's estimate of the risk.8 9 In the absence of such insurance, however,
the consequence of the law's consumer protection effort is clearly
86. If patients vary in their propensity to sue and thus in the value they place on their tort rights,
those providers who are forced by law to offer their services without limiting their liability exposure
will attract those patients who are most likely to sue. The resulting higher insurance costs, once
reflected in fees, will drive away those patients who place a lower value on full tort rights and
presumably are less likely to invoke them. Such adverse selection would be destructive of fee-forservice practice.
87. See infra note 91, describing the problems associated with collective choice.
88. A possible danger is the use of standard-form contracts by community practitioners. Thus,
should a local medical society propose such a contract, consumers might find it difficult to locate a
physician willing to serve them on other terms. Antitrust law would govern any agreement to adopt a
uniform contract, even one purporting to be a desirable reform. Cf Paramount Famous Lasky Corp.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) (an agreement by film distributors to contract for the exhibition
of films only on the condition that every exhibitor accept the arbitration provisions of the standard
exhibition contract, whereby arbitration and arbitration awards were enforced by the collective
action of these distributors, constituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade).
89. This example also illustrates the possible consequences of another judicially created
safeguard. If the mother cannot by contract bind her expected offspring to a different set of legal
rights, the baby's health will be jeopardized by the mother's inability to receive care. On this issue,
see Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965) (holding child bound by arbitration
clause); Atiyah, supra note 47, at 295.
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undesirable. The courts must be aware of the possible destructiveness of
good intentions.
V
CONCLUSION:

CONSUMER CHOICE VERSUS PROFESSIONAL MONOPOLY

The proposal to encourage privately negotiated malpractice reforms
provides an excellent occasion for comparing the changing conceptual
foundations of public policy toward the health care industry with the premises
of malpractice law itself.9 0 Although the ideological underpinnings of the old
health care system are rapidly giving way, they still support some relics of the
old monolithic edifice. In particular, some features of malpractice law-such
as its faith in professional custom as a benchmark for judging professional
performance, its exclusion of efficiency considerations, and its assumption
that the legal system must define all rights and duties-distinctly manifest the
old paradigm of a centrally regulated health care system supplying a uniform
product.
It is a striking irony that the discomfiture of the medical profession under
the present tort system results in significant part from the law's incorporation
of the profession's own premises about the nature of health care and the
patient's entitlement. This article has shown how changing premises of health
policy and changing practices of buyers and sellers of health services are
invalidating some basic assumptions of tort doctrine. In particular, it is no
longer necessary-and indeed it is destructive-for the law aggressively to
oppose contractual modifications of tort rights. Although courts should
continue to ensure that bargains are struck under conditions conducive to
informed and meaningful choice, they should also be cognizant of the
substantial benefits that consumers may gain from private reforms of tort
rules. Critics who fear the consequences of letting consumers fend for
themselves in the health care marketplace should be reassured by the
continued presence of limited judicial oversight.
In the larger health care marketplace, consumer choice is proving a useful
corrective for professional dominance and for physicians' myopic tendency to
focus on the presumed benefits of their services, to underweigh costs and
other side effects of their ministrations, and to undervalue alternatives such as
prepaid group practice, contract practice, and prevention. Just as consumer
choice has undermined the tyranny of the old health care system's traditional
values and standards, the health care industry's new competitiveness offers
consumers opportunities to bypass the legal system's monopoly over the
90. Professor Atiyah's critique in this symposium, supra note 47, of the proposal to encourage
private reform reveals sharply how one's conception of health care as a centrally defined entitlement
produced by a unitary delivery system influences one's judgment on the proper source and
mutability of tort rules. Contrary to Professor Atiyah's suggestion that my advocacy of contractual
tort reforms is aimed at bringing about a privatization of doctor/patient relationships, id. at 293-94,
the argument here is that such privatization has already occurred and that the time has come for the
law to accommodate itself to demonstrable changes in national health policy and in the marketplace
itself.
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costly business of making and administering rules for allocating the risk of
iatrogenic injury. The proposal to let consumers select in the marketplace the
rules they wish to govern medical injuries can be viewed as a challenge to
lawyers' professional dominance analogous to that which consumer choice has
lately mounted against professional hegemony in the medical field. Similarly,
the legal system's predictable resistance to consumer choice can be seen as a
manifestation of the same kind of professional distrust of consumer
sovereignty that physicians have long displayed. It would be ironic, indeed, if
the medical profession were to be victimized by inescapable tort rules
prescribed by a legal monopoly strongly analogous to the medical monopoly
that for so long denied people meaningful choices with respect to professional
services.
In the final analysis, it is necessary to appeal to the good will and
democratic values of the legal system to obtain the needed enlargement of the
realm of consumer choice in this area and to prevent the preclusion of change
by any means other than the political and judicial processes. Not only would
reform through consumer choice take pressure for law reform off the political
system, but it would permit desirable experimentation and the optimal
satisfaction of differing consumer needs and preferences. It remains, of
course, an open question whether this path to tort reform would be much
traveled even if it were clearly open for traffic. 9' Nevertheless, it is not
implausible that, once this option becomes recognizably available, 92
consumers will gradually come to realize that voluntary modifications of their
91. The education of consumers in this area could be a slow process, requiring as it does
instillation of an appreciation that the rights to be surrendered are of limited value and that the
potential cost savings to be realized, while not large for any individual, are worth obtaining. The
educational problem may be exacerbated in the context of collective choices made in the
employment setting. Because of the unlikelihood that any one individual's "vote" will determine the
group decision, no individual has much incentive to inform himself of the merits of the choice being
made. See generally M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971). Similarly, if employers or
union leaders perceive that a reform will be misinterpreted by the mass of uninformed workers as a
retraction rather than a conferral of benefits, they will pass up the opportunity to effectuate it. An
HMO may likewise fear that any effort on its part to change liability rules will be misconstrued by
consumers.
The alternative to collective choice is individual choice, allowing a consumer a discount if he
waives particular rights. In these circumstances, the consumer's incentive to inform himself is
increased (though the discount may still not be enough to induce him to master the complexities of
the subject). The most promising model is perhaps an employer-negotiated option for individuals to
choose care from a single provider with or without his full tort rights. Such options might be
tendered together with disinterested advice on the advantages and disadvantages of each.
Whether liability insurers will pass on to providers savings proportional to their success in
negotiating waivers of tort rights with their patients is another problematic question. See Note,
Customizing Liability Rules in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1986, at 238-39. Unless they do, of course, the cost savings and thus the incentive to change
approaches would be minimal, except for self-insured providers.
Despite these reasons for doubting that private reforms will soon or ever be forthcoming in the
real world, it still seems desirable for the legal system to make room for them. It is generally
desirable to let individuals benefit from economizing choices. In time, consumers may learn where
their true interests lie and become less enamored of a legal system that ostentatiously holds out
"rights" while systematically hiding the price tag.
92. It is a fair observation that, because the law has not definitively blocked private reforms in
the past, the lack of initiatives may signify a lack of interest on the part of consumers. See Atiyah,
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tort rights can serve their interest in obtaining good health care and financial
security at a reasonable cost.

supra note 47, at 299. The issue is ultimately empirical, however, and it remains to be seen whether
changes in the legal climate will in time elicit any interest in privately negotiated tort reforms.

